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INJUNCTIONS BY THE NUMBERS: LESS THAN
THE SUM OF ITS PARTS
LINDA J. SILBERMAN*
INTRODUCTION
The law on standards for granting or denying preliminary injunc-
tions has never been a model of clarity, either verbal or otherwise.I The
various courts of appeals have framed the standard in different ways2 and
have deviated significantly in the application of the relevant factors con-
sidered on a motion for preliminary relief.3 Even within a single circuit,
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; B.A. 1965, J.D. 1968, University of
Michigan. Special thanks to my colleague Lewis Kornhauser for his help in translating symbols into
words, and to my research assistant, Ilene Balsam, for her more traditional contribution.
1. See Black, A New Look at Preliminary Injunctions: Can Principles from the Past Offer Any
Guidelines to Decisionmakers in the Future?, 36 ALA. L. REV. 1, 25 (1984); Castles, Interlocutory
Injunctions in Flux: A Plea for Uniformity, 34 Bus. LAW. 1359, 1359 (1979); Leubsdorf, The Stan-
dard of Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 526 (1978); see also Developments in the
Law: Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1055 (1965).
2. For example, in the Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs must show (1) no adequate remedy at law
and/or irreparable harm, (2) that the harm the plaintiff will suffer is greater than the harm the
defendant will suffer if the injunction is granted, (3) that the plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits, and (4) that the injunction will not harm the public interest. See Schultz v.
Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339, 1342 (7th Cir. 1986).
In the Sixth Circuit, however, the standard is whether (1) movant has shown a strong or sub-
stantial likelihood or probability of success on the merits, (2) whether movant has shown irreparable
injury, (3) whether the preliminary injunction would harm third parties, and (4) whether the public
interest would be served by issuing the permanent injunction. See Frisch's Restaurant, Inc. v.
Shoney's Inc., 759 F.2d 1261, 1263 (6th Cir. 1985). See also 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948, at 430 (1973) (setting forth a general standard).
3. Generally, there are three methods of applying these factors. The strictest, used in the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits, is the "sequential" approach, calling for the plaintiff to independently prove
each factor beyond a threshold level. Therefore, if the plaintiff fails to prove only one of the factors,
the request for relief will be denied. This approach stems from a policy of extreme caution where
granting injunctive relief is considered "the exception rather than the rule." Mississippi Power &
Light Co. v. United States Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985); see also United
States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1519-20 (11 th Cir. 1983); Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489
F.2d 567, 572-76 (5th Cir. 1974).
Another more permissive approach, the "two alternative tests," is used in the Second Circuit.
It requires the plaintiff, after first showing irreparable harm, to show either likelihood of success on
the merits or "sufficiently serious questions going to the merits" and a balance of harms "tipping
strongly in plaintiff's favor." See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264,
273 (2d Cir. 1986); Jack Kahn Music Co., Inc. v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 604 F.2d 755, ;758
(2d Cir. 1979).
The third approach used by the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C.
Circuits is the "balancing of factors" test. The courts using this method look at plaintiff's showing
on each of the four factors and weigh each against the other. If one factor is extraordinarily strong,
for example, it will compensate for a weaker showing of another factor. This test is popular because
it requires judges to apply all of the four factors to the analysis which promotes greater caution. Yet,
unlike the sequential test, it allows the judge to use greater discretion by balancing the relative
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the formulations of the applicable criteria have differed substantially.4
The result, as one commentator termed it, is "a dizzying diversity of for-
mulations." Another has characterized the situation as one where "the
practitioner is doomed to frustration."
'6
The last thing that seemed warranted was yet another attempt at
formulation of the standard. But in a series of recent decisions,7 the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has added its contribution to
the confusion and frustration about the appropriate substantive standard
for the issuance of preliminary injunctions. It has even proposed an alge-
braic formula, which even fewer practicing lawyers will understand.8 In
the process, the court has also engendered a new debate about the nature
of appellate review in preliminary injunction suits.9
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT IN SEARCH OF THE STANDARD
The most noteworthy of the new line of Seventh Circuit cases, at
least the one that has attracted the most attention, is American Hospital
strengths and weaknesses of plaintiff's case. See generally Black, supra note 1, at 26-43 (discussing
the three approaches).
4. For example, in the Seventh Circuit, compare the four traditional factors listed in Schultz,
807 F.2d at 1342 with EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254, 1259 (7th Cir. 1980) adding a fifth
requirement that plaintiff show that the injunction will result in the return to the status quo, and
with Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982) proposing a
different standard altogether: "the decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction involves a
comparison of the probabilities and consequences (public as well as private), of two types of error:
granting an injunction to an undeserving plaintiff, that is, one who will not be able to establish a legal
right to an injunction when the case is tried in full... , and denying an injunction to a deserving
plaintiff." Id. at 123. The Seventh Circuit cases are discussed in Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser
Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 382-86 (7th Cir. 1984).
5. Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 526.
6. McLaughlin & Tallon, Preliminary Injunction Relief in the Federal Courts in I. ALI-ABA
RESOURCE MATERIALS, CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 877,
at 879 (4th ed. 1987).
7. See Centurion Reinsurance Co. v. Singer, 810 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1987); Schultz v. Frisby,
807 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986); Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d
722 (7th Cir. 1986); Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir.
1986); Brunswick Corp. v. Jones, 784 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1986); Lawson Prods., Inc., v. Avnet, Inc.,
782 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1986); American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589
(7th Cir. 1986); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984).
8. In American Hosp. Supply, Judge Posner instructed:
grant the preliminary injunction if but only if P X H, > (I - P) X Hd, or in other words,
only if the harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is denied multiplied by the probability that
the denial would be an error (that the plaintiff, in other words, will win at trial), exceeds
the harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted, multiplied by the probability that
granting the injunction would be an error.
780 F.2d at 593.
9. See Centurion Reinsurance Co., 810 F.2d at 143; Proimos v. Fair Automotive Repair, Inc.,
808 F.2d 1273, 1275 (7th Cir. 1987); Illinois Corp. Travel, 806 F.2d at 730 (Flaum, J., concurring);
Brunswick Corp., 784 F.2d at 274-75 n.2; Lawson Prod&, 782 F.2d at 1436-39; American Hosp. Sup-
ply, 780 F.2d at 594; American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 602 (Swygert, J., dissenting); Roland
Mach., 749 F.2d at 388-91; Roland Mach., 749 F.2d at 396-400 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
INJUNCTIONS BY THE NUMBERS
Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products, Ltd. 10 In American Hospital, Judge
Posner, always equal to the task of introducing numbers where words
will usually do, I articulated a standard first proposed by Professor Leub-
sdorf some years earlier.12 According to this standard, a preliminary in-
junction should be granted "if but only if P X Hp > (1 - P) X Hd."'1 3
Translating for those of us who were never very good at symbolic logic,
Judge Posner explained that an injunction should issue
only if the harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is denied, multiplied
by the probability that the denial would be an error (that the plaintiff,
in other words, will win at trial), exceeds the harm to the defendant if
the injunction is granted, multiplied by the probability that granting
the injunction would be an error.14
Explaining the formula as the one which best minimizes the cost of error
and characterizing it as the "procedural counterpart" to Judge Learned
Hand's negligence formula, t5 Judge Posner insisted that he had not of-
10. 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986).
11. See Posner's interpretation of the Hand negligence formula in United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1026 (7th Cir. 1982); See generally
Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 865-68 (1981);
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972); Posner, Law and the Theory of
Finance: Some Intersections, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 159 (1986); Posner, The Summary Jury Trial
and Other Methods Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHi. L.
REV. 366, 368-69 (1986).
12. Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 541-49. After illustrating the confused history of the standard
for deciding whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction, Professor Leubsdorf suggests a
model that aims "to minimize the probable irreparable loss of rights caused by error incident to
hasty decision." Leubsdorf's model is the result of investigating the harm an erroneous decision
might incur, and trying to minimize that harm. This investigation requires two inquiries: first, it
should appraise plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits; second, it should "assess the probable
loss of rights to each party if it acts on a view of the merits that proves to be erroneous." Putting the
two together, Leubsdorf writes that the court
in theory, should assess the probable irreparable loss of rights an injunction would cause by
multiplying the probability that the defendant will prevail by the amount of the irreparable
loss that the defendant would suffer if enjoined from exercising what turns out to be his
legal right. It should then make a similar calculation of the probable irreparable loss of
rights to the plaintiff from denying the injunction. Whichever course promises the smaller
probable loss should be adopted.
Id. at 542 (footnotes omitted).
Leubsdorf offers this analysis as a model knowing that reducing factors to hard figures is "im-
practical." Nevertheless, he offers it as an alternative to the "intuitive approach" that judges often
use and stresses that statistical analyses "are familiar tools in decisionmaking theory." Id. at 543.
The remainder of the Leubsdorf article holds the model up in comparison to other approaches to
preliminary injunctions. "Even were its application impossible," he writes, "it provides a coherent
analysis that points out the merits of some popular formulas and the defects of others." Id. at 544.
13. American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 593.
14. Id.
15. Id. (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Ct. 1947) (where
Judge Hand's negligence formula first appeared)). In the formula, liability depends on whether
B < PL, where P is the probability the event potentially causing harm will occur, L is the gravity of
the resulting injury, and B is the burden of adequate precautions. See also Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, supra note 11, at 32-33; Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD., 323, 332-35 (1973).
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fered any new legal standard but was merely assisting analysis by "distil-
ling the usual four or five factors" 16 that are always taken into account
by courts in deciding whether or not to grant a preliminary injunction.
An analysis of American Hospital, as well as the Seventh Circuit's
other case forays into the land of preliminary injunctions gives rise to
three main observations: first, that there is general difficulty in trying to
formulate the proper standard to guide district courts in their exercise of
the formidable power to issue preliminary injunctions; second, that at-
tempts to broaden the appellate court's scrutiny of the district court's
exercise of its discretion over these matters are misguided; and third, that
the introduction of Judge Posner's mathematical formula for granting or
denying preliminary injunctions does not clarify the standard and
emerges as a disguised effort to extend the heavy hand of appellate
review.
THE PRIOR SEVENTH CIRCUIT STANDARD
Judge Posner premised his claim that the formula had not changed
preliminary injunction analysis by pointing to his earlier opinion in Ro-
land Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries 17 in which he set forth the ver-
bal counterpart to the algebraic formula. Judge Posner's linkage between
Roland Machinery and American Hospital may well be accurate, but Ro-
land Machinery itself may have marked a departure from the approach
that had previously prevailed in the circuit. In Roland Machinery, Judge
Posner collected and analyzed the relevant Seventh Circuit authority on
the question of what standard was in vogue in the circuit and found sub-
stantial inconsistencies:
Some of our cases imply that although each of the four factors
must be considered, the plaintiff need not prevail on all four (citing
cases). But other cases say that a preliminary injunction is an ex-
traordinary remedy which is not available unless plaintiffs carry their
burden of persuasion as to all of the [four] prerequisites. 18
On the issue of success, Judge Posner also noted that the cases alter-
nated between requiring the plaintiff to show a "reasonable likelihood of
success," "some likelihood of success," and "contentions on the merits
... so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair
ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation."' 9
Notwithstanding the admitted confusion in these cases, Judge Pos-
16. American Hasp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 593.
17. 749 F.2d 380.
18. Id. at 383 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 384.
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ner in Roland Machinery suggested that the differences were ones of
phraseology and were more apparent than real. Moreover, he claimed
that the circuits were virtually uniform in the list of factors to be evalu-
ated in deciding whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction:
whether plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable
harm, whether plaintiff's harm outweighs that which defendant will suf-
fer if the injunction is granted, whether plaintiff has exhibited a likeli-
hood of success on the merits, and the impact of the decision on third
parties.20 However, Judge Posner failed to acknowledge that there were
substantial deviations in the circuits as to how these factors are analyzed.
Instead, he indicated the proper approach was to use a "sliding scale" as
a means of balancing the various factors and that "the more likely the
plaintiff is to win, the less heavily need the balance of harms weigh in his
favor; the less likely he is to win, the more need it weigh in his favor."
'21
Although not the only methodology of balancing the factors, the
Roland Machinery approach does comport with that followed in a ma-
jority of the circuits. 22 Nonetheless, it may have marked a departure
from prior Seventh Circuit law. Generally, there have been three distinct
approaches to analyzing the agreed-upon factors relevant in preliminary
injunction cases. At one end of the scale is the "sequential approach",
where plaintiff must independently prove each of the four traditional fac-
tors beyond a certain threshold level. 23 Because each of the elements
must be met individually, the standard for preliminary relief is relatively
strict. At the other end of the spectrum is the rule followed in the Sec-
ond Circuit, 24 where the plaintiff must show irreparable harm and then
"either likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious ques-
tions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a
balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the
preliminary relief."' 25 This standard offers a more permissive approach to
20. Id. at 386-88.
21. Id. at 387.
22. Id.; see also Black, supra note 1, at 30.
23. See Black, supra note 1, at 26-29.
24. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 283 (2d Cir. 1986);
Jack Kahn Music Co., Inc. v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 604 F.2d 755, 758 (2d Cir. 1979) (for the
circuit's current standard).
25. The Second Circuit's "two alternative tests" approach was originally much more permissive
than it is today. The method was initiated in Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483
F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973). To grant injunctive relief, that court required plaintiff to prove either
"probability of success and possible irreparable harm, or sufficiently serious questions going to the
merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward
the party requesting the preliminary injunction." Id. Since Sonesta, however, the test has been
revised due to the increasing emphasis on the need to show irreparable harm. Thus today, Second
Circuit plaintiffs must show irreparable harm first, and then "either likelihood of success on the
merits or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation
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the issuance of a preliminary injunction, since there is no need to show a
balance of harms in plaintiff's favor at all if irreparable harm and likeli-
hood of success on the merits have been established.
Midway between these two approaches appears to be the "sliding
scale" approach, which Judge Posner in Roland Machinery argued would
best minimize the risk of error in preliminary injunction decisions. He
explained that since the "cost" of erroneously denying an injunction in-
creases with the magnitude of the harm the plaintiff will incur from the
denial and the probability that the plaintiff will eventually win at trial,
and the "cost" of erroneously granting an injunction increases with the
harm the defendant will incur from the grant and defendant's probability
of eventually prevailing, these elements should be measured against one
another.
26
The risk of error is obviously an important aspect of the preliminary
injunction decision, and attention to this factor may well justify the "slid-
ing scale" approach adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Roland Machin-
ery. To this extent, whether Roland Machinery clarified prior confusion
in the circuit or changed the standard altogether is of footnote signifi-
cance.27  Indeed, the attention paid to Roland Machinery and subse-
quently to American Hospital by other panels in the circuit had little to
do with the standard itself, although it bears mentioning here that the
precise functional relationship between probability of success and magni-
tude of harm as reflected in the formula was not necessarily spelled out in
Roland Machinery.28 The more significant agenda in both Roland Ma-
chinery and American Hospital relates to the role designated for the ap-
pellate court on review of the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction.
and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief."
Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 264 (citing Jack Kahn Music, 604 F.2d at 758). See also Black, supra note
1, at 41-42 (discussing the movement away from Sonesta).
26. American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 593-94.
27. Before Roland Mach. the Seventh Circuit was known to use the sequential test, (that used
by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits) as the standard for preliminary injunctions. See Black, supra
note 1, at 29 n.153. In McDermott, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Frye, Inc., for example, the court vacated
an injunction because plaintiff failed to demonstrate the likelihood of success, without looking at any
of the other three factors. 649 F.2d 489, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1980). In Jones v. Franzen, the court
reversed a lower court injunction because plaintiffs did not show that the balance of harms was in
their favor. 697 F.2d 801, 804 (7th Cir. 1983). See also Technical Publishing Co. v. Lebhar-Fried-
man, Inc., 729 F.2d 1136, 1139 (7th Cir. 1984); Shaffer v. Globe Protection, Inc., 721 F.2d 1121,
1123-25 (7th Cir. 1983); Singer Co. v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 671 F.2d 232, 234-36 (7th Cir. 1982); but
see Roland Mach., 749 F.2d at 383 (for a list of earlier cases that follow different standards).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 125-27.
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APPELLATE REVIEW IN ROLAND MACHINERY
AND AMERICAN HOSPITAL
The claim for a broader and more vigorous appellate review was
first made in words by Judge Posner in Roland Machinery. Acknowledg-
ing that the standard articulated by the Supreme Court for review of
preliminary injunctions was "abuse of discretion," Judge Posner sug-
gested that the standard itself may not have been at issue in any of the
Supreme Court cases articulating the standard29 and that the "abuse of
discretion standard seems to have been assumed rather than ex-
amined."'30 Judge Posner argued that preliminary injunctions are sup-
posed to be granted or denied in accordance with a standard and not as a
matter of judicial grace. He reasoned that since the district court applies
a "legal standard to a state of facts," its determinations can be considered
"factfindings for purposes of the clearly erroneous standard. ' 31 Ac-
knowledging that balancing the various factors to be taken into account
in preliminary injunction cases "invites an exercise of judgment by the
district judge" 32 to which the court of appeals should defer even more
broadly than when applying a substantive standard, Judge Posner none-
theless proposes something more than the limited abuse of discretion
scope of review in use for other kinds of case-specific issues. Thus, Judge
Posner distinguishes preliminary injunction cases from other categories
of cases which invoke the abuse of discretion standard, such as criminal
sentences and rulings on discovery and evidentiary questions, where the
issues are not based on a standard and are not susceptible of uniform
treatment.3
3
Disclaiming the necessity to be "any more precise than this about
the meaning of 'abuse of discretion' in the context of appellate review of
orders granting or denying preliminary injunctions," 34 Judge Posner
29. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1974); Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 457
(1973).
30. Roland Mach., 749 F.2d at 384.
31. Id. at 385 (citing 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 2580-2590 (1971). Such exercises in characterization and classification are the classic means of
manipulating the scope of appellate power. See Childress, "Clearly Erroneous:" Judicial Review
Over District Judges in the Eighth Circuit and Beyond, 51 Mo. L. REV. 93, 131-37 (1986); Louis,
Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified
View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C.L. REV.
993, 1017-38 (1986).
32. Roland Mach., 749 F.2d at 385.
33. Id. at 389. Compare Judge Friendly's observation in Noonan v. Cunard S.S. Co., 375 F.2d
69, 71 (2d Cir. 1967) of the reasons for appellate deference to the trial judge's exercise of discretion:
"his observation of the witnesses, his superior opportunity to get the 'feel of the case' . . . and the
impracticality of framing a rule of decision where many disparate factors must be weighed."
34. 749 F.2d at 390.
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rephrases the appropriate appellate inquiry to be whether the district
judge "exceeded the bounds of permissible choice" 35 in the circumstances
of the case. In Roland Machinery, the district court had granted a pre-
liminary injunction to require the defendant manufacturer to continue
supplying the plaintiff dealer with its line of construction equipment.
Although the dealership agreement provided that it could be terminated
by either party with cause on ninety days notice, the plaintiff claimed
that the agreement had been unlawfully terminated because it was dis-
tributing a competing line of construction equipment and alleged a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. In granting the injunction, the district judge
found a likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff in that the plaintiff
would probably go out of business without the injunction. However, the
district court also took into account defendant Dresser's contention that
the plaintiff was likely to promote its competitor's line rather than
Dresser's if the injunction were granted, thus subjecting Dresser to irrep-
arable harm. The judge therefore granted the preliminary injunction but
conditioned it on Roland's maintaining the approximate market share it
had currently obtained for the defendant's products.
In reviewing the district court's decision in accordance with its
newly formulated standard of review, the Roland Machinery majority
disagreed with the district court's assessment of harms. First, it found
that the judge erred in too readily assuming that the plaintiff would be
likely to go out of business in the absence of an injunction. Second, the
panel criticized the district judge in failing to consider the impact on
competition of the provision in the injunction that froze Dresser's market
share under the injunction, finding that the court had made an error of
law in imposing the condition. The court then assumed for itself that
there was now no clear balance of hardships that weighed in the plain-
tiff's favor. Proceeding to apply the "sliding scale" formula, the majority
found that the plaintiff was now required to show that it was more likely
than not to win. After a lengthy discussion of the competitive and anti-
competitive effects of exclusive dealing, the panel determined that the
plaintiff had "failed to show that it is more likely than not to prevail at
the trial on the merits,"'3 6 and reversed the grant of the injunction.
One member of the Roland Machinery panel, Judge Swygert, dis-
sented from the majority's reversal of the injunction. Commending the
majority for its "effort to delineate a coherent standard for the grant of
35. Id.
36. Id. at 395.
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preliminary injunctions" 37 and endorsing the "sliding scale" approach,
Judge Swygert faulted the majority for its attempt at wholesale revision
of the appellate standard in the law of preliminary injunctions. Judge
Swygert argued that despite the reliance on a so-called standard, the bal-
ancing and flexibility that are necessary for determination of the issuance
of the injunction must rest with the district court, not the appellate court.
He stressed the need to have the district judge tailor relief to the individ-
ual circumstances of the case and the superior opportunity of the district
court to "get the feel of the case." Indeed, on the specific facts of Roland
Machinery, Judge Swygert illustrated how the majority's revision of ap-
pellate review enabled it to usurp for itself the ultimate power of decision
in a preliminary injunction case. Even assuming the appellate court was
correct in concluding that the district court overestimated the likelihood
that the plaintiff would go out of business, Judge Swygert emphasized
that the estimate of harms between the plaintiff and the defendant in this
case was still a close one, and not necessarily one that the appellate court
could make better than the district judge. The balancing undertaken by
the majority merely substituted its judgment for that of the district court
and was an inappropriate exercise of appellate review.
Judge Posner's translation of the Roland Machinery standard into
an algebraic formulation in American Hospital reinforced the agenda of a
broader role for appellate courts in preliminary injunction cases. With-
out addressing for the moment whether the formula accurately reflects
the Roland Machinery test of when an injunction should be granted, or
whether the formula has introduced its own set of functional
equivalents, 38 the use of a formula certainly enhances the claim that in-
junctions are issued according to a measurable standard, which should
then be capable of appellate review. It carries the sense that the decision
to issue a preliminary injunction has precision and is more than a mere
discretionary judgment. If decisions to grant or deny preliminary injunc-
tions are susceptible of measurement by a formula, those determinations
appear closer to a legal rule or standard capable of de novo review. 39
At first glance, of course, the Seventh Circuit's action in American
Hospital-which was to affirm the district court's grant of the injunc-
tion-does not seem to point to an enhanced role for the appellate court.
Indeed, curiously, that it is Judge Swygert-who argued against the
heightened standard of review in Roland Machinery-who urges that the
37. Id. at 396 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 125-27.
39. 749 F.2d at 388-89.
287
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district court's grant of the injunction be reversed. However, a careful
look at the majority and dissent in American Hospital reveals that both
Judge Posner and Judge Swygert have remained faithful to the positions
they articulated in Roland Machinery.
In American Hospital, the district court had granted a preliminary
injunction to plaintiff American Hospital Supply, the largest distributor
of hospital supplies in the United States, forcing its supplier Hospital
Products to continue its contract with the plaintiff. Hospital Products, a
substantially smaller business which produces surgical stapling systems,
had cancelled the contract despite an automatic renewal clause in the
contract that became operative in the absence of a notice to terminate by
the distributor. Hospital Products claimed that American Hospital had
engaged in various conduct constituting a repudiation of the distribution
agreement and thus treated the contract as terminated.
The district court had issued the injunction because it found that the
plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law and would suffer irreparable
harm because the defendants were on the brink of insolvency and the
losses, including that of the plaintiff's good will, were not immediately
calculable. The court also found that the plaintiff had "some likelihood
of success on the merits." In applying the "sliding scale" approach enun-
ciated in Roland Machinery, the district judge then engaged in balancing
the harm between the parties and measuring it against the parties'
probabilities of success. The district court noted, but discounted, the
harm to the defendant from the insolvency the defendant claimed would
be induced if an injunction were issued. It found that the plaintiff's loss
of market and good will exceeded the potential harm to the defendant
and that the plaintiff, unlike the defendant, had more than enough re-
sources to compensate the defendant by way of damages should the de-
fendants ultimately prevail.
The district court conceded that each of the parties accused the
other of breaches and that it was "unclear who will prevail."' 4 However,
having found the balance of harms strongly in plaintiff's favor, the court
observed that the plaintiff need only show that it have some likelihood of
success on the merits. Finding this requirement met, the district court
granted the injunction.
Writing on appeal, Judge Posner continued on the path he had be-
gun to chart in Roland Machinery. First, he reiterated the standard for
the grant of a preliminary injunction established in Roland Machinery
40. American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 613 (Appendix).
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and set it forth in algebraic terms. 41 Second, while paying lip service to
the "abuse of discretion standard," he indicated, as he did in Roland
Machinery, that an appellate court should give some but not too much
deference to the district court's determination.42 Interestingly, the panel
(Judge Posner and Judge Pell in the majority and Judge Swygert in dis-
sent) was unanimous in finding that the district court had erred in failing
to give sufficient consideration to the effect of a preliminary injunction in
precipitating the insolvency of the defendant. The majority then itself
evaluated the balance of harms, with the defendant's insolvency now ad-
ded into the equation. Concluding that the district court was "on solid
ground" 43 in finding that the plaintiff had some likelihood of success, the
majority stated that such a finding was sufficient for the issuance of the
injunction. Even with the defendant's insolvency factored into the as-
sessment of harms, the majority was not persuaded that the district court
had erred in concluding that the balance of harm sloped in favor of the
plaintiff.44 The appellate court applied the formula and found that a
weighting of the factors-harm to the parties and probability of suc-
cess-justified the injunction.
In a bristling dissent, Judge Swygert criticized the majority for its
transformation of the usual appellate role. In the course of his opinion,
he also described the formula as a "homeric siren,"' 45 offering a "seduc-
tive but deceptive security,"' 46 which in the end he argued was misap-
plied. On the central debate over what is the appropriate standard of
appellate review, Judge Swygert found the majority's affirmance of the
injunction "inexplicable ' 47 under these circumstances where the entire
panel agreed that the district court had ignored a critical factor in the
balance of harm equation: the impact of a preliminary injunction on the
defendant Hospital Product's insolvency and the importance of that issue
in calculating the balance of harms.
In Judge Swygert's view, the district court's failure to consider this
factor was a "crucial aspect" of the district court's decision to grant the
preliminary injunction, and amounted to a clear error of law. Review of
the district court's action on this ground was the classic and appropriate
standard for review of the district court's issuance of the preliminary in-
junction and could only justify reversal; affirmance of the injunction by
41. Id. at 593.
42. Id. at 594-95.
43. Id. at 599.
44. Id. at 598.
45. Id. at 605 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 595-96.
47. Id. at 604.
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the American Hospital majority was yet another example of an unjustified
appellate role. The majority itself articulated a new set of justifications
that would now support the grant of the injunction. Thus, they specu-
lated that without the injunction, the plaintiff might suffer a series of
additional harms, such as potential loss of good will, misinterpretation of
the termination by plaintiff's customers, and potential jeopardy to plain-
tiff's investment dealers who might not want to get enmeshed in a legal
dispute.48 In effect, they found that according to their own assessment
and evaluation, an injunction should issue-not that the district court
had properly granted one. Judge Swygert argued that not only was there
no support in the record for these "imagined harms,' ' 49 but also that the
majority had inappropriately moved from simply reviewing the findings
of the district court to constructing new findings of fact as they saw fit. 50
To the extent that the algebraic formula was an incentive for the
appellate court to offer its own assessments of probabilities, its use has
aggrandized appellate power. Of course, Judge Swygert, although no fan
of the mathematical version, faults the majority for failing to apply the
formula's sliding scale premise, which calls for the plaintiff to show a
probability of winning commensurate with the degree of parity of the
harm.51 After factoring in the defendant's insolvency, Judge Swygert
claimed that the record in American Hospital only reflected a parity of
harms, and thus the plaintiff should have to "show that it is more likely
than not to win."' 52 But the majority, after inconclusively discussing the
merits of the charges and counter-charges of wrongful termination and
anticipatory breach, could only characterize the dispute as "legal bad-
minton."153 That determination might have supported the district court's
conclusion that the plaintiff had shown "some likelihood of success,"
but, according to Judge Swygert, since there was no clear balance of
hardships in favor of the injunction, a more substantial probability of
winning was required. 54
As noted above, the majority was able to approve the injunction
because it reassessed for itself the parity of harms, and, despite the con-
sensus that the defendant's insolvency had been overlooked, the majority
determined anew that the balance of harms strongly favored the plaintiff.
Ironically, the court could have more closely examined the conduct of
48. Id.
49. Id. at 610.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 607.
52. Id. at 598.
53. Id. at 599.
54. Id. at 607.
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the parties to determine whether the distributorship agreement had been
breached, since this was a legal question subject to full-scale review.
However, it refrained from attention to that task and instead intruded on
a de novo basis into the area of harms balancing, where traditionally def-
erence is required.
SUBSEQUENT RESPONSES IN THE CIRCUIT
The reformulation of the standard for the issuance of preliminary
injunctions set forth in Roland Machinery and American Hospital and the
revisionist standard of appellate review adopted in those cases did not go
unnoticed by other members of the court. Although the "sliding scale"
approach as the standard for issuance of injunctions has generally met
with favor, there has been little enthusiasm for conceptualizing its con-
tent in an algebraic formula. In addition, several judges expressly took
issue with any express or disguised attempts to broaden the scope of ap-
pellate review in preliminary injunction cases.
In one of the first cases to discuss both the formula and the "re-
vised" appellate standard, Lawson Products, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc.,55 a unani-
mous panel affirmed a district court denial of a preliminary injunction
and expressly invoked a limited scope of appellate review. Judge Flaum,
writing for the court, did offer a weak endorsement of the Posner formula
as it pertained to the standard for issuing preliminary injunctions, ac-
knowledging that it provided an "effective shorthand method of expres-
sing ... the important relationship between the likelihood of success on
the merits and the degree of the harm to the non-prevailing party."'5 6 At
the same time, however, he emphasized the danger of creating a false
impression that there could be a single correct result and highlighted the
inconsistency between a mathematical formula and the flexibility and dis-
cretion that should be entrusted to the district court in a preliminary
injunction case. 57 Turning specially to that discretion and the appropri-
ate standard of review to be exercised by the appellate court, the Lawson
panel insisted that deference must be given to the district judge's weigh-
ing and balancing of the equities,58 and reaffirmed that the standard of
review of the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is abuse of dis-
cretion. Interestingly, Lawson actually presented a stronger case for in-
vocation of a heightened scope of review than either Roland Machinery
or American Hospital since the case was submitted on affidavits without a
55. 782 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1986).
56. Id. at 1439.
57. Id. at 1439-40.
58. Id. at 1434.
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hearing and there were no issues of credibility to detract from a de novo
review of the record. 59 However, in affirming the denial of the Lawson
plaintiff's attempt to enjoin one of its competitors from engaging in activ-
ities to lure away sales people and interfere with customer relationships,
this Seventh Circuit panel reaffirmed the traditional abuse of discretion
standard of appellate review. 60
A different Seventh Circuit panel's affirmance of a preliminary in-
junction denial in Ball Memorial Hospital v. Mutual Hospital Insurance
Co. 6t provided another opportunity for explicit commentary on the stan-
dard for issuance of injunctions and the appropriate scope of appellate
review. In Ball Memorial, the court affirmed the district court's denial of
plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction to prevent defendant prov-
iders of health care financing from adding a preferred provider plan.
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court, cited Roland Machinery and
American Hospital and referred to the "costs" of issuing the injunction.
Judge Easterbrook also discussed at length various "public interest"
costs in terms of pro and anti-competitive effects on the market which he
believed justified the district court decision. 62 This independent analysis
may have been the catalyst for the special concurrence by Senior District
59. Id. at 1434-36. Recently, however, in Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 105 S. Ct. 1504
(1985), the Supreme Court refused to relax the "clearly erroneous" test of FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) to a
trial judge's findings of historical fact that did not depend on assessments of credibility. The Court
reasoned that "duplication of the trial judge's efforts in the court of appeals would very likely con-
tribute only negligibly to the accuracy of the fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial
resources." Id. at 1512. See also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982); 1985 amend-
ment to FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (expressly adopting the "clearly erroneous test" to findings of fact
"whether based on oral or documentary evidence.").
60. Id. at 1437.
61. 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986).
62. In American Hosp. Supply, the "public interest disserved" factor of earlier opinions was not
mentioned in the decision until the very end when Posner addressed Hospital Product's last argu-
ment that the injunction is against the public interest. "All such an argument means," Posner
writes, "is that the injunction has effects on nonparties. ... 780 F.2d at 601. In terms of the
formula as applied in American Hosp. Supply, Posner explains that harm to nonparties is part of the
harm to Hd.
Despite American Hosp. Supply's cursory treatment of the public interest argument, the public
interest is given much greater weight in the sliding scale analysis in other Seventh Circuit cases
involving constitutional rights. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986), a case where
plaintiffs asserted fourth and fourteenth amendment rights in an effort to enjoin a state agency from
conducting physical examinations on possible child abuse victims, is one example. The court says
that the "wild card" is the public interest which "takes on special importance in constitutional cases
where the outcome will undoubtedly affect countless persons." Id. at 898.
In accordance with the weighting described in American Hosp. Supply, the public interest
figures into the harm factor of the defendant in Darryl H. The court considers the state agency to be
the "protector of the concerns of human life and safety." Id. at 894. However, in ACLU v. City of
St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 458 (1986), the public interest
factor tips the balance of harms in favor of plaintiffs who assert a violation of the establishment
clause, but cannot prove irreparable harm to themselves. Posner writes, "the trivial inconvenience
suffered by one of the plaintiffs is only a small fraction of the potential harm inflicted by the defend-
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Judge Will sitting by designation. Judge Will endorsed the court's opin-
ion because it was "consistent with the traditional standards for granting
or denying a preliminary injunction"; 63 in addition, he allied himself with
the Lawson court's reading of Roland Machinery and American Hospital
as leaving the "traditionally flexible and discretionary responsibilities" 64
of preliminary injunction matters with the district judge. Finally, Judge
Will opined that the use of the American Hospital formula was an unnec-
essary diversion. Complimenting the district judge on the thoughtful
consideration of each of the traditional four factors for issuance of the
injunction, Judge Will observed that the quality of justice would hardly
have been improved had the district court invoked the formula and its
use would only have diverted the court from the equitable tasks at hand.
Cautioning that "if it ain't broke, don't fix it,"65 Judge Will emphasized
that the traditional standards had functioned well for the district judge in
this case. He expressed the hope that the opinion in Ball Memorial,
along with Judge Flaum's opinion in Lawson, had buried "with kind-
ness" 66 the legal revisionism undertaken in Roland Machinery and Amer-
ican Hospital.
Other appellate cases in the circuit have seemed content with the
Roland Machinery-American Hospital "sliding scale" approach but have
not attempted to invoke the algebraic counterpart or to introduce any
numerical assessments. 67 Moreover, there is evidence of a slight retreat
ant's alleged violation of the establishment clause." Id. at 275. See generally Shreve, Federal Injunc-
tions and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 382 (1983).
It is also of interest to note that preliminary injunction cases involving constitutional issues are
also distinguishable, aside from the public interest factor, in that they appear to produce a more
vigorous appellate review. This is probably because in considering the likelihood of success on the
merits factor, appellate judges apply well-established legal standards derived from constitutional law
which they have the right to review de novo. Cf Brunswick Corp., 784 F.2d at 274 n.2. Therefore, in
both Darryl H. and City of St. Charles, the appellate judge writes a very detailed discussion of the
merits issue. See also Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986).
63. 784 F.2d at 1346 (Will, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 1346 (quoting Lawson, 782 F.2d at 595).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. To date, no numbers have been used in appellate preliminary injunction decisions after
American Hosp. Supply. In fact, with the exception of Lawson, the formula in its algebraic language
has not yet to be repeated except in a footnote distinguishing it from the accepted traditional stan-
dard. See Brunswick Corp., 784 F.2d at 274 n.1.
Similarly, no numbers have been used at the district court level with the exception of one case
that analyzed the likelihood of success factor in terms of percentages. In MidCon Corp. v. Freeport
McMoran, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1475 (N.D. III. 1986), the court said that if the harms balanced out,
then "under Judge Posner's formula, plaintiff must show 'a better than 50 percent change of winning
the case.' " Id. at 1479-80.
Most other district court judges, however, have either ignored the formula or have distinguished
it as did Judge Eschbach in Brunswick and Judge Flaum in Lawson. In Nagy v. Custom Hoists, Inc.,
for example, the court said that Judge Posner's formula does not require "impossible mathematical
precision" but rather is "an attempt to clarify conceptually the district court's technique in deciding
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from Judge Posner's claim for a heightened standard of review. For ex-
ample, in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp.,68 a takeover case in
which the panel unanimously affirmed the district court's denial of an
injunction, Judge Posner himself, though using the "sliding scale" analy-
sis to determine the propriety of whether an injunction should issue,
never mentioned the American Hospital "formula." Moreover, although
this appellate panel did assess the balance of harms without any express
reference to the balancing undertaken by the district judge, it found that
the "harms are very difficult to quantify and it seems best to treat them
as offsetting."' 69 On the question of the likelihood of success, the panel
did make a de novo judgment, but this review was on the merits of the
legal claim where the appellate court's role is very much like that in an
appeal from a final judgment and where deference should not be
required.
70
A similar tack was taken by Judge Eschbach, writing for a unani-
mous panel in Brunswick Corp. v. Jones,7' where the court affirmed a
grant of preliminary relief to enforce a covenant not to compete. The
court appeared to defer significantly to the district court's assessment of
the harms, which it had said weighed heavily in the plaintiff's favor. The
appellate court noted that as a result the plaintiff need establish only a
modest likelihood of success and that determination depended upon the
legality of the restrictive covenant under state law. On that question of
law the proper standard of review is de novo 72 and the court of appeals
could independently review the district judge's legal conclusions upon
which the preliminary injunction was based.
However, two other cases in the circuit appear to more directly
motions for preliminary injunctions." 629 F. Supp. 675, 678-79 (E.D. Wis. 1986). In a recent
decision another district court said, "The Seventh Circuit had insisted that this algebraic formula
does not represent a new standard for granting preliminary injunctions. . . . In application, the
formula is more unwieldy than its clean, algebraic expression suggests. Thus with great interest (and
some relief) the court heeds the Seventh Circuit's admonition in [Brunswick and Lawson]." Means
Servs. Inc. v. Rental Uniform Servs., 639 F. Supp. 208, 212 n.1 (C.D. IIl. 1986). See also Laidlaw
Acquisition Corp. v. Mayflower Group Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1513 (S.D. Ind. 1986); Stove, Furnace &
Allied Appliance Worker's Int'l Union, Local 185, AFL-CIO v. Weyerhaeuser Paper Co., 650 F.
Supp. 431 (S.D. Ill. 1986); Frank v. Ducy, No. 85 C 9642, slip op. (N.D. Ill. July 24, 1986).
68. 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986).
69. Id. at 252.
70. Id. at 253; See also Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion. 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 773-78
(1982).
71. 784 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1986).
72. See Brennan, Standards of Appellate Review, 33 DEF. L.J. 377, 406 (1984); Jaffe, Judicial
Review: Questions of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239 (1955); Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial
Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173 (1978) [hereinafter Appellate Review]; Rosenberg, Judicial Discre-
tion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 646 (1971) [hereinafter
Judicial Discretion].
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question the "sliding scale" approach, at least to the extent that "mea-
surements" of success and harm seem to be required. In Beermart v.
Stroh Brewery, 73 the circuit panel made no reference to the comparative
assessments required by the Roland Machinery and American Hospital
verbal and mathematical formulations of the standard for issuing prelim-
inary injunctions. Instead, a more traditional analysis was invoked
which considered each of the four elements more or less individually.
Although the appellate court reversed the grant of a preliminary injunc-
tion preventing Stroh from terminating its agreement with the plaintiff
for the sale of beer, it did so on its review of the merits of plaintiff's
ultimate success. The district court had relied on an Indiana statute
prohibiting the "unfair" termination of a contract between a beer whole-
saler and a brewer for the sale of beer to support the injunction, but the
appellate court pointed to express language of the agreement prohibiting
certain conduct in which the plaintiff had engaged. The striking aspect
of Beermart is that the court of appeals never suggested that the plain-
tiff's likelihood of success was in any way relevant to the degree of rela-
tive harms existing between the parties. 74  The implication is that,
regardless of harm, the plaintiff must show some absolute prospect of
success, which the Beermart plaintiff did not meet.
In contrast, the panel majority in Illinois Corporate Travel v. Ameri-
can Airlines75 affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction but only
after it engaged in an exhaustive analysis of the "strength" of the plain-
tiff's claim. The district court had rejected plaintiff travel agency's claim
that American Airlines' policy of preventing travel companies from writ-
ing tickets if they advertised discounts was per se illegal and violated the
antitrust laws, finding the claim "weak" on the merits.76 On appeal, the
court approved the district court's assessment of the balance of harms
apparently in defendant's favor. But presumably taking the percentage
calculations of the Posner formula seriously (although no specific men-
73. 804 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1986).
74. Stroh had terminated its agreement with Beermart because Beermart had sold overaged
beer in violation of § 11 of its contract with Stroh. On the merits issue, the appellate court held that
the district court's use of the Indiana statute "superceding" the plain language of the contract was
erroneous and was therefore an abuse of discretion. Id. at 411. The court also looks at and refutes
Beermart's other arguments on the merits in support of upholding the injunction. Unpersuaded, the
court says that because Beermart committed fraud by selling the overaged beer -[they] deserved
termination .... [E]quitable relief is not available to parties who came to the court with unclean
hands." Id. at 412. For this reason alone, without discussion of any of the other factors, the appel-
late court reverses. Compare Andreas Proimos v. Fair Automotive Repair, Inc., 808 F.2d 1273 (7th
Cir. 1987) where Judge Easterbrook said a franchiser who may have engaged in fraud against con-
sumers might still be entitled to equitable relief against its franchisees.
75. 806 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1986).
76. Id. at 724.
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tion is made of the mathematical formula), the court thought it necessary
to "measure" the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits. Finding
that the district court was correct in assessing both the plaintiff's likeli-
hood of success as "slight" and the balance of harms in defendant's
favor, the court affirmed the denial of the injunction.
77
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Flaum criticized the major-
ity's approach to appellate review and indicated disenchantment with the
notion that the appellate court could assign weights to any of the relevant
factors. Judge Flaum pointed out that the district court found that the
plaintiff had met its "threshold burden" to establish likelihood of suc-
cess, 78 but denied the injunction because of insufficient irreparable harm
and a balance of equities in defendant's favor.79 All the appellate court
should do, he argued, was to review the district court's finding of a bal-
ance of harms in defendant's favor. If that finding is approved, as it
was,80 the denial of the injunction must be affirmed. Because the weigh-
ing and balancing of the "success" and "harm" factors involve a "highly
discretionary" evaluation and one to which the appellate court must give
substantial deference, 8' the court's review of the "entire spectrum of con-
tested issues raised by plaintiff's complaint"8 2 was, Judge Flaum argued,
unwarranted. 83 Certainly at the appellate level, Judge Flaum appears to
resist the Posner formula, which would seem to require-as the panel
majority apparently thought-an investigation of the strength of the
plaintiff's claim.
8 4
77. Id. at 729.
78. Id. at 730.
79. Id.
80. After finding that the district court was right in its assessment that plaintiff's likelihood of
success on the merits is slight, Judge Easterbrook says that this conclusion entitles him to follow the
district court's method and "discuss irreparable injury only briefly." 806 F.2d at 729. Discussing
points raised in the record, (like McTravel's association with other airlines allowing advertising of
discounts), and reiterating the district court judge's conclusions, the court "defers to her judgment,"
citing Lawson and American Hosp. Supply, and writes: "It is enough for now that we concur in the
district court's conclusion that McTravel is unlikely to prevail on the merits." Other factors weigh-
ing into the balance of harms, it concludes, "are questions for the district court in any further pro-
ceedings." Id. at 729-30.
81. Id. at 731 (Flaum, J., concurring) (quoting Lawson, 782 F.2d at 1437).
82. Id. at 731 (Flaum, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 730. Judge Flaum's view appears to be that the appellate courts limited role is to
(1) assure that the correct standard for the issuance of a preliminary injunction has been employed
and (2) review the district court's determination as to whether the threshold requirements have been
correctly determined as a matter of fact and law. The question of balancing these factors is commit-
ted to the district court's discretion. Thus, in Illinois Corporate Travel, once it appeared that the
district court had correctly assessed a low but threshold level of success but inadequate harm, the
balance of those factors was not one for the appellate court to re-evaluate.
84. Indeed, Judge Flaum notes that even the district court was not required to "measure"
whether plaintiff's probability of success balanced against the harm it would suffer if the injunction
were denied would exceed the defendant's probability of success balanced against the harm it would
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A very recent circuit opinion reviewing the denial of a preliminary
injunction may reflect a shift in Judge Easterbrook's position slightly to-
ward Judge Flaum's approach. In Proimos v. Fair Automotive Repair,
Inc.,85 the district court denied a preliminary injunction because it found
that the party seeking the injunction could be compensated by damages
at the end of the case and that the party resisting the injunction would
suffer irreparable injury to loss of reputation value if the injunction is-
sued. Although noting that the district court did not have an "airtight
case for the denial of an injunction, '8 6 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of the preliminary injunction because the "balanc-
ing of the equitable factors is a task in which the district court possesses
great discretion because there is no 'right' answer."'8 7
A review of these Seventh Circuit cases tells an interesting story of
judicial dialogue within a single court. In Lawson, Judge Flaum reached
a strained conclusion in holding that the opinions in Roland Machinery
and American Hospital were "in harmony with the traditionally flexible
and discretionary responsibilities of the district judge, sitting as a chan-
cellor in equity."' 88 In another recent decision,89 Judge Swygert, who in
Roland Machinery and American Hospital offered strong criticism of
both a quantitative approach and heightened appellate review, seemed
ready to now read those cases as "not [changing] any of the law gov-
erning preliminary injunctions" 90 and that "concerns about the continu-
ing validity of the traditional approach to preliminary injunctive relief in
this circuit are misplaced." 9'
For his part, Judge Posner has not attempted to push the point, but
on the other hand, has not completely retreated. In a somewhat unusual
context-review of a district court's determination of whether to dissolve
a preliminary injunction 92-Judge Posner continued to press his "cost
suffer were the injunction granted. Although he concedes a district court might consider these fac-
tors as part of its weighing of the equities, "it is not required to do so." 806 F.2d at 731 n.l.
85. 808 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1987).
86. Id. at 1277.
87. Id. However, the appellate court reversed the district court's further grant of "summary
judgement" and the denial of a permanent injunction because there was not proper notice of a con-
solidation of a full trial on the merits under FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).
88. Lawson, 782 F.2d at 1432-33.
89. Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986).
90. Id. (quoting Lawson, 782 F.2d at 1441).
91. Id.
92. This case involved an appeal of an order by a district court dissolving a four-year-old in-
junction. The injunction had frozen $200,000 worth of Centurion's (the original plaintiff's) assets
which Singer (the original defendant) had transferred into his own personal account fearing Hiatt,
the majority shareholder of Centurion, was diverting the company's premium income to his personal
use. The district court dissolved the injunction because Centurion was short on funds and wanted
access to the money in the Singer account. Singer appealed the order because he still feared Hiatt
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minimization" approach in at least verbal form. In Centurion Reinsur-
ance Co., Ltd. v. Singer,93 Judge Posner wrote that the district judge
must ask, "[I]s the expected cost of dissolving the injunction--consider-
ing the probability that dissolution would be erroneous because the plain-
tiff really is entitled to injunctive relief, and consequences of such an
error-greater or less than the expected cost of not dissolving the injunc-
tion?" 94 "If greater," he writes, "the injunction should not be dissolved;
if less, it should be." 95 However, Judge Posner now appears to limit the
circumstances in which balancing is necessary to confirm the existence of
certain threshold requirements: "No matter how strongly the balance of
irreparable harms may incline in favor of the party asking for a prelimi-
nary injunction, it is error to grant the injunction if the party has no
chance or only a very slight chance of prevailing on the merits."
'96
Interestingly, Judge Flaum, who in Lawson had diplomatically
praised the Posner formula as providing "an effective shorthand method
of expressing the important relationship between the likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits and the degree of harm to the non-prevailing party,"
97
later emphasized that such an approach is only one aspect of the general
discretion entrusted to the district court:
While a district court has discretion to consider these factors as part of
its effort to weigh the equities, it is not required to do so. The circuit
continues to adhere to the traditional equitable doctrines governing
preliminary injunctions. We have not adopted "a new legal standard
... intended.., to force analysis into a quantitative straight jacket."
'98
The judges of the circuit appear to have made a deliberate attempt
to avoid a direct showdown on the issue of the correct standard for issu-
ance of a preliminary injunction, the scope of appellate review, and the
wisdom of a mathematical formula. The latest opinions strive to recon-
cile the dissension that appeared in the earlier cases at least to the extent
of limiting exposure of a clash of formally articulated standards. None-
theless, beneath the mantel of judicial civility and collegiality remains a
fundamental and important question concerning the relationship between
the district and appellate courts in preliminary injunction cases.
would squander the money. Because there was a lack of law on the issue, Posner analogized the
standard for dissolving a preliminary injunction with the standard for granting or denying one.
Later in the decision, he views Singer's appeal contesting the dissolution of the injunction as an
application for a new preliminary injunction limiting what Hiatt could do with the funds.
93. 810 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1987).
94. Id. at 143.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 145.
97. Lawson, 782 F.2d at 1434.
98. Illinois Corporate Travel, 806 F.2d at 731 n.1 (Flaum, J., concurring) (quoting American
Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 593).
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DISCRETION AND THE SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW IN
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASES: THE DEBATE ASSESSED
The claim for heightened appellate review over the decision of
whether or not a preliminary injunction should issue was first made by
Judge Posner in Roland Machinery99 without any direct reference either
to his verbal or to his mathematical formula. Therefore, although his
later attempt in American Hospital to articulate a quantitative formula
can be viewed as serving the purpose of identifying a rule-based standard
capable of full appellate review, the argument for broader review is here
analyzed independently of the formula itself.
Judge Posner is correct, as others have pointed out, in observing the
confusion around the "abuse of discretion" standard for review of pre-
liminary injunctions. 1° ° Certain aspects of the decision of whether to is-
sue a preliminary injunction have always been open to more vigorous
scrutiny. For example, the question of a party's likelihood of success on
the merits is based largely on issues of law, and although the resolution
may turn on a specific set of facts that are played out at the preliminary
injunction hearing, the appellate court is in an exceptionally good posi-
tion to evaluate the issue of success on the merits. The role of the appel-
late court in that situation is not much different from its ordinary review
powers after a completed trial. 101 This is because the success on the mer-
its factor is usually evaluated by legal standards which the appellate
court can review de novo. Here the appellate court stands on equal, if not
superior, footing to the district court, compared to situations where fac-
tual issues are concerned, or where the balance of equities is being con-
sidered. In those contexts the district court is in the better position to
evaluate, and the appellate court should defer to their discretion since
decisions on those factors are often determined on the basis of intangibles
and rely on a complete perspective of the case at hand.
Second, as Judge Posner emphasizes-indeed it is the heart of his
argument for a broader standard of review-that preliminary injunctions
are based on a "legal standard" and are not issued as a matter of "judi-
cial grace." 10 2 Therefore, he argues that determinations by the district
court can be considered findings of fact and reviewed at least under a
99. Roland Mach., 749 F.2d at 390-92.
100. Id. at 390; see also American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 594; Christie, An Essay on Discre-
tion, 1986 DUKE L.J. (1986); FRIENDLY, supra note 70, at 764, 784; Judicial Discretion, supra note
72 at 650-53.
101. See Lawson, 782 F.2d at 1437.
102. Roland Mach., 749 F.2d at 385.
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"clearly erroneous standard."' 03 Here, too, I think Judge Posner will not
find too many dissenters if what he means is that, because there is a stan-
dard which requires, for example, a balance of harms, the district court
can be reversed if it fails to take a particular factor into account. Indeed,
in American Hospital itself, Judge Swygert, who objects to a broad stan-
dard of appellate review in general, embraces the view that the district
court was wrong in failing to consider the potential insolvency of the
defendant in calculating the balance of harms between the parties.1° 4
However, the existence of a standard or of identifiable elements on
which to make a discretionary judgment does not inevitably lend support
for review of the exercise of the discretion itself. Once the district court
has identified all of the factors, the question is whether the assessments of
parity of harms and probabilities of success and their relative balance
ought to lie ultimately with the trial or the appellate court. Surely Judge
Posner would concede that such determinations-even if not standar-
dless--call for individualized and case specific analysis.
Nonetheless, there may be a specialized claim that, in the context of
preliminary injunctions, broader appellate review is justified. Prelimi-
nary injunctions have traditionally been seen as "drastic" remedies' 0 5
and exercises of "far-reaching power[s]."' t 6 Often, the decision of
whether to issue the injunction turns out to be the only disposition in the
case because preliminary relief is, as a practical matter, the heart of the
matter. In those circumstances, at least, the grant of such preliminary
relief should be very carefully scrutinized. 07 Moreover, because of the
preliminary nature of the relief and the expedited nature of the proceed-
ing, there is often not a fully developed factual record. The district judge
103. Id.
104. Two months after the injunction was ordered by the district court, Hospital Products Ltd.
filed for bankruptcy. In the majority opinion, Posner asserts that Hospital Product's insolvency was
apparent to the district judge, despite the fact that they had not yet filed for bankruptcy, and that
this should have been considered as irreparable harm to defendant. American Hosp. Supply, 780
F.2d at 596-97. Judge Swygert, in his dissent, explains that the district court refused to consider the
insolvency issue because the district court concluded that "defendants may not excuse their unlawful
actions by their actual or threatened insolvency." Id. at 605 (Swygert, J., dissenting). He calls the
district court's dismissal of the insolvency issue "a clearly erroneous conclusion of the law." Id. In
doing so, he makes a stronger statement than the majority, who merely disapproved of their "over-
look[ing]" the issue. Id. at 598.
105. Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1974); See also Black, supra note 1, at
27; Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 525. See generally Developments in the Law: Injunctions, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 994 (1965).
106. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Gittone, 110 F.2d 292, 293 (3d Cir. 1940) (per curiam).
107. Though there are cases that stand for the proposition that there should be a broader scope
of appellate review on orders granting preliminary injunctions, e.g., Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp.,
454 F.2d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 1971), other cases indicate that the practice is to use the same standard
to review judgments granting as those denying injunctions. Roland Mach., 749 F.2d at 384.
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is often acting more on hunch, probability, and speculation than he
would be in a full-scale trial for permanent relief. Thus, we are less confi-
dent of either the "assessments" or the "balancing" that is reached by the
district judge. Because the balancing of the various factors is likely a
"judgment call," the appellate tribunal may be in as good a position as
the district court to make the determinations.
Finally, since a critical factor in the equation is a less than hard-
edged judgment based on a balancing of harms and a weighing of
probabilities of success and harms to the parties, there is a claim that
three judges rather than one should make the assessments. 108 A consen-
sus of three judges about the comparability of harms to the parties, par-
ticularly in the context of projecting what harms are likely to result, is
somewhat more assuring than that of a single district judge. Indeed, be-
cause Congress itself has provided for interlocutory review of grants or
denials of preliminary injunctions, 10 9 it might be said that a more mean-
ingful power of appellate review had been envisioned by Congress in
these cases.
However, any such transfer of basic control over the issuance of pre-
liminary injunctions to the appellate court comes with significant costs.
Traditionally, substantial deference is given to the district court's weight-
ing and balancing of the equitable factors that govern the issuance of an
injunction, because the trial judge is in the best position to have a com-
plete perspective of the case.'1 0 Whatever the limitations of a less than
fully developed record, the district court nonetheless has had the oppor-
tunity to hear the testimony of witnesses and to evaluate the credibility
about issues of fact and even projections of harm; its perspective is obvi-
ously different from that of a cold appellate record."I As the circuit
panel in Lawson observed, "while an appellate court can distinguish a
good injunction decision from a bad one, the appellate process is not well
suited to an appreciation of the subtle shadings of a case that may lead to
a judgment which lies between the extremes."11 2
Another untoward aspect of greater appellate control is the poten-
tial for an overcommitment of judicial resources to the preliminary in-
junction case. That allocation imbalance results from a variety of
108. See Judicial Discretion, supra note 72, at 642, "[Slince most trial courts are manned by a
single judge and appellate courts are collegial, our fondness for appellate review may also reflect a
feeling that there is safety in numbers."
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1982).
110. See Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience ofAppellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 780-82
(1957).
111. Lawson, 782 F.2d at 1437.
112. Id. at 1438.
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factors. Ordinarily, the request for a preliminary injunction advances to
the head of the civil case queue;' 1 3 thus, the present calendaring rules
give the preliminary injunction case a priority on the generally back-
logged district court dockets. Because the grant or denial of a prelimi-
nary injunction is, unlike most other interlocutory orders, immediately
appealable," 4 the preliminary injunction case has also been allocated an
appellate priority within the judicial system. If broader powers of appel-
late review are exercised by the courts of appeals, the litigants in a pre-
liminary injunction case have every incentive to appeal and to have their
very fact-specific claims of harm re-evaluated by the appellate court. The
combined effect of accelerated judicial intervention, interlocutory appeal,
and heightened judicial review arguably result in an overcommitment of
appellate resources. The concomitant incentive for relitigation of the
whole range of issues at stake in preliminary injunction cases also threat-
ens to impose an unwarranted burden on the judicial system. Indeed, it
is ironic that Judge Posner, who, in other contexts, has written about the
general crisis in the federal courts and the resulting burdens upon the
courts of appeals,' '5 has been inattentive to the additional administrative
costs his "new" formulation for issuance of preliminary injunctions is
likely to produce.
The relationship between the prevailing legal norms and the balance
of harms should also support the more traditional scope of review re-
garding the district court's evaluation and weighing of its factors. Of
course, as Judge Friendly observed in his thoughtful essay on judicial
discretion,' 16 review of the legal merits by appellate courts is a "favorite
method" to avoid the discretion rule in preliminary injunction cases. As
noted earlier, the issue of probable success lends itself to broader review,
and thus the appellate court should have de novo power over the propri-
ety of the applicable legal standard. However, it is less likely that Judge
Friendly was endorsing similar scrutiny on the issue of the balancing of
harms, where meaningful standards do not exist and highly individual-
ized determinations are necessary. In addition, when the appellate court
asserts its own views of comparable harms and the balance of equities, it
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1657 (1982).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1982). This is because the preliminary injunction is traditionally
thought of as an extraordinary and far-reaching remedy and therefore should be subject to immedi-
ate checking for error. If the injunction was in error, the aggrieved party should not have to con-
tinue suffering the oftentimes irreparable harm caused by the decision. See Comment, Civil
Procedure-Interlocutory Appeal, 63 MASS. L. REV. 85 (1978).
115. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985). See also Hellman, Book
Review, 39 STAN. L. REV. 297 (1986)
116. Friendly, supra note 70, at 777.
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may be in fact "double-counting" because its focus is speculative harms
intertwined with legal norms rather than individual facts of the case. For
example, in antitrust and other economic harms cases, the balance of
harms may be confused with the abstract harms that justified the sub-
stantive legal rule-in part because the appellate court is working from a
cold appellate record and not from a set of individualized facts for which
it has a "hands on" feel.
The Seventh Circuit's dialogue has been instructive in separating out
three quite separate sets of issues which are subject to review in prelimi-
nary injunction cases. A strong argument can be made that the standard
for review on each of them should be quite different. The element of
likelihood of success implicates a legal issue, and therefore, appellate re-
view is close to the de novo standard. The question of irreparability of
harm and the harms existing for each of the parties are based on facts
presented at the hearing and may be reversed only if "clearly erroneous."
Finally, the weighing of harms-i.e., who suffers the more significant
harm-and the balancing of the factors according to a "sliding scale"-
i.e., measuring success against harm-should remain within the district
court's discretion. The appellate court should maintain only a superin-
tending role whereby it remains a check on whether the district court has
issued a "good" or "bad" injunction." 7 In order to assure that these
quite distinct review powers are appropriately exercised, the district
court should be required to set forth separate findings on each of the
elements of the preliminary injunction standard. Thus, on appeal, the
court of appeals will be able to direct its attention to each of the issues
with no confusion as to the scope of its review powers. Although district
courts presently make findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule
52(a) in all cases, including those involving preliminary injunction," 8 a
more specific requirement would aid the process and perhaps help sort
out for the litigants and the court those cases that truly call for an appel-
late look." 19
117. Lawson, 782 F.2d at 1438.
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
119. If the district court is required to set forth separate findings on each of the elements re-
quired for issuance of a preliminary injunction, the appellate court would no longer have to make the
time-consuming effort of sorting out which findings apply to which issues, and which standard of
review applies to which findings. The result would be that the appellate court would know, at a
glance, whether an in-depth or merely "superintending" review is necessary depending on whether,
for example, the district court's finding on the likelihood of success, or the balance of harms is the
pressing issue on appeal. Recognition that certain complex procedural determinations might involve
separate standards of review of individual component parts has been recognized in other contexts.
See Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels:
A Unified View of the Scope of Review, The Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64
N.C.L. REV. 993, 1030-46 (1986).
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SQUARING THE CIRCLE: THE FUTILITY OF A FORMULA
As I have previously indicated, the attention directed to the alge-
braic formula set forth in American Hospital 120 has been somewhat of a
diversion and not particularly essential to the more critical debate about
the appropriate standard for appellate review of preliminary injunction
determinations. Nonetheless, it would be remiss not to comment upon
the relationship of the formula both to the traditional criteria employed
for issuance of injunctions and to the proper appellate standard for re-
view of district court decisions.
Judge Posner has insisted that the formula merely represents a "dis-
tillation" of the traditional factors that a court generally considers when
it decides whether to grant or deny the preliminary injunction. But un-
less the symbolic formulation of P X Hp > (1 - P) X Hd clarifies or
enhances for lawyers and judges the decision of whether to grant a pre-
liminary injunction, there is no need to bother.' 2 ' Judges and lawyers,
for the most part, function comfortably in a world of language and
words, not algebraic formulae and numerical assessments of
probability.' 22 Thus, the burden of persuasion is on Judge Posner to
show that analysis is somewhat enhanced by reliance on the formula.
Moreover, the formula has introduced a measure of confusion into
the law of preliminary injunctions, notwithstanding Judge Posner's asser-
tion that he has merely "translated" the standard previously announced
in Roland Machinery. For example, the traditional requirement that a
plaintiff must establish that there is no adequate remedy at law before an
injunction may issue does not seem to be reflected in the formula itself,
which considers only probability of success and the balance of harms to
each party. Judge Eschbach commented on this apparent disparity in a
120. E.g., Riley, Has Judge Posner Gone Too Far? (Ideology and Precedent in the Seventh Cir-
cuit), 8 NAT'L L.J., Sept. 1, 1986, at 3, col. 1; Rubenstein & Reskin, Posner's Mathematical Formula
for Injunctions, 72 A.B.A. J. May, 1986, at 96(1); Moore, You Say You Want an Injunction? Practice
Your Math, 8 LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
121. American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 609 (Swygert, J., dissenting). Judge Swygert writes:
I question the necessity and wisdom of the court's adoption of a mathematical formula as
the governing law of preliminary injunctions. The majority claims that its formula is
merely a distillation of the traditional four-prong test. But if nothing is added to the sub-
stantive law, why bother? The standard four-prong test for determining whether a prelimi-
nary injunction should issue has survived for so many years because it has proven to be a
workable summation of the myrial factors a district court must consider. ...
See also Ball Memorial Hosp., 784 F.2d at 1346 (Will, J., concurring).
122. Judge Swygert also writes, "The majority disavows any effort to force the district courts
into a 'quantitative straitjacket,' but I suspect that today's decision may lead to just that .... Like a
Homeric Siren the majority's formula offers a seductive but deceptive security. Moreover, [it] invites
members of the Bar to dust off their calculators and dress their arguments in quantitative cloth-
ing .... I do not envy the district courts of this circuit and I am not proud of the task we have given
them." 780 F.2d at 609-10 (Swygert, J., dissenting). See also Brunswick Corp., 784 F.2d at 274 n.l.
INJUNCTIONS BY THE NUMBERS
footnote in Brunswick Corp. v. Jones,123 observing that the formula, of
necessity "cannot incorporate all of the elements of the traditional
test." 124 Further elaboration might reveal that in balancing the harms to
the parties-arguably irreparable harms 125-the "adequate remedy" fac-
tor has been incorporated into the formula. But the need for additional
explanation certainly undercuts the value of the short-hand symbolic
formulation.
Another surface difference between the traditional standard for issu-
ance of preliminary injunctions and that set forth in the American Hospi-
tal formula is the apparent omission of concern for the potential harm to
third parties and the public, a factor not expressly accounted for in the
formula. However, Judge Posner in American Hospital itself, quickly ex-
plained that the harms suffered by third parties could be considered as
part of Hp or Hd, as the case may be. 126 Once again, if this type of addi-
tional explanation must be given, it is hard to understand the value of the
formula.
Moreover, there are indications that when the "sliding scale" con-
cept in Roland Machinery is translated into a rule implicating numerical
equivalents for P X Hp > (1 - P) x Hd, the standard for issuance of
the injunction has been slightly altered. As an example, the formula does
not suggest that any threshold amount of harm or probability of success
is necessary. Traditionally, however, an injunction would not issue if the
plaintiff could not show a sufficient likelihood of success-notwithstand-
ing a substantial imbalance of harms between the parties. Indeed, Judge
Posner, in a later opinion, 127 seems to have accepted this view of the law
and states that a certain threshold level of success must be met before an
injunction may issue.128 This later embellishment, however, is certainly
not self-evident from the formula itself.
Not only may the formula err in depicting the functional relation-
ship between success and harm and in ignoring lower bound threshold
123. 784 F.2d at 274 n.1.
124. Id.
125. Judge Posner uses the term "harm" alone in American Hosp. Supply when describing the
factor "balancing of harms," and in fact "harm" alone is used in his formula. 780 F.2d at 593.
However, since the first element that must be proved according to the traditional standard referred
to by Judge Posner is "irreparable harm" if the injunction is denied, it is likely (but arguable) that
the harm referred to by Judge Posner in the balancing of harms is irreparable harm. Other judges
insist that the balancing is of "irreparable harms." See Brunswick Corp., 784 F.2d at 274, n. 1.
126. American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 601.
127. Centurion Reinsurance Co., 810 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1987).
128. Judge Posner wrote, "[n]o matter how strongly the balance of irreparable harms may in-
cline in favor of the party asking for a preliminary injunction, it is error to grant the injunction if the
party has no chance or only a very slight chance of prevailing on the merits." Id. at 145.
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levels of success and harm, but it may also be incorrect in equating the
differentials between success and harm i.e., by failing to take account of
upper bound thresholds. In some instances, for example, the magnitude
of harm to the plaintiff (although only slightly greater than harm to the
defendant) may be such that it outweighs the "slight" differential in
probability of success favoring the defendant. If this discussion of such
functional relationships partakes of a certain abstract quality, the flaw
lies in the attempted use of the formula itself. Even if the functional
relationships in the formula were correct, there is no practical way of
articulating precisely what those measures are. Both probability of suc-
cess and harms to plaintiff and defendant are highly complex assess-
ments, not reducible to a simple numerical measurement.
The best that can be said about the American Hospital formula is
that it helps to conceptualize the notion of relativity between harm to the
parties and likelihood of success once initial requirements are met. The
limitations of the formula are both its implication that there is only this
particular relationship between harm and success and the suggestion that
the relationship can be described, not merely in a broad discretionary
way, but through a more precisely weighted measurement. Finally, there
is also the subtle but implicit link that if assessments can be made, the
appellate court may exercise broad reviewing powers over the findings by
the district court since it may itself make these new assessments of harm
and probability of success.
Like the circle that cannot be squared, 29 the discretion and fact-
specific analysis for the issuance of preliminary injunctions cannot be
quantified. The magnitude of harms, the balance of harms, and the like-
lihood of success do not readily translate into numbers. For that reason,
the introduction of this formula into the law of preliminary injunctions is
misleading. The symbols themselves, such as Hp and Hd, need additional
explanation. The formula creates the illusion of a rule where none exists
and conveys a false impression of precision. The false sense of precision
also gives rise to the misguided claim for broader appellate review by
implying that assessments of harm and success are quantifiable and are
subject to review like other rule-based measures.
The value of a formula is either to assist in making a prediction or to
help in explaining a result.130 In this instance, the formula does neither.
It can never incorporate all the fact-specific and individualized circum-
129. In 1882, C.L.F. Lindemann proved the impossibility of construction of a square whose area
is that of a given circle. I ENCYCLOPEDIA DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS 182 (S. Iyanga & Y.
Kawada eds. 1980).
130. Brilmeyer & Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L.
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stances that are before the district court when it is asked to rule on a
request for a preliminary injunction; and it oversimplifies a set of difficult
and intricate assessments that by their nature are speculative to begin
with.
The formula set forth in American Hospital is one that equals less
than the sum of its parts and is of no utility. Hopefully, the days of a
formula for the issuance of preliminary injunctions are numbered.
REV. 116, 120-30 (1978). The conclusion of the authors in discussing mathematical modeling is well
worth heeding:
since legal problems are subtle and complex, the unquantifiable variables may well dwarf
the quantifiable ones and make numerical modelling futile. It is therefore understandable
that courts have been reluctant to enter into a quixotic chase after precision. .-. . (b]efore
we throw ourselves into a frenzy of measurement, we should stop to think about what and
why we measure. Our results will be less "precise," but more faithful to the legal setting.
Id. at 153.
For a critique of mathematical formulae in other contexts, see Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971); Walker, Mathematical
Models of Legal Rules: Application, Exploitation, and Interpretation, 13 CONN. L. REV. 33, 37-51
(1980).
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